Extracting a coherent foreign policy from the administration’s incoherence.
HISTORY is most easily understood through a process of categorization and classification. Think of the intellectual richness of the Enlightenment, or the veiled corruption of the Gilded Age, or the global trepidation of the Cold War. Along these lines, one rather neat way to categorize America’s attitude towards the world is to slice it into two halves: pre-WWII and post-WWII.
Before the Second World War, isolationism was not just a conventional and popular idea; indeed, it was a point of pride for America. Meddling in European affairs was anathema to a public who could still recall the incandescent rage of being under the British Crown. Even into the early 20th century, such an attitude remained baked into the American psyche. Why bother with foreign matters while a litany of domestic problems persist? America first.
After the Second World War, America came to her senses. She realized foreign and domestic policy are two sides of the same coin. She saw that the projection of American power abroad helps to facilitate trade, cross-border cooperation, and collective defense. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, which would later develop into the United Nations once Hitler had been quashed. Shortly thereafter, the I.M.F. (which would organize international financial flows), the World Bank (which would fund development projects), and G.A.T.T. (an ambitious trade agreement) bound the world’s economies together, with the U.S. at the helm. Thus, the post-WWII order was born.
DURING his inaugural address, Donald Trump proclaimed a new era in American policy: “From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first. America first.” This new vision, though ill-defined and often incoherent, is a mistake. America has the most to lose from abandoning the post-WWII order.
America’s dollar is the world’s trading currency, allowing it to rack up unusually high levels of debt and get off scot-free. (Greece had to be bailed out by the I.M.F. in 2010 with a debt-to-G.D.P. ratio of 115%. The U.S.’s current ratio is 104%.) America is able to project power in nearly any nation on Earth, enabling it to secure vital trade routes and defend vulnerable allies like South Korea and Latvia. The Federal Reserve, which controls U.S. monetary policy, has unmatched clout in global finance; U.S. government bonds are widely considered to be essentially risk-free.
Why, then, does Mr. Trump appear to view the post-WWII order as tearing apart the fabric of American society? For the first few weeks of his nascent administration, one plausible explanation was that the president, influenced by his ideologue-in-chief Steve Bannon, saw the world as transactional and zero-sum—if other countries have in any way benefited from the post-WWII order, the U.S. must, therefore, be losing.
Friday’s strikes in Syria belie this explanation. Mr. Trump’s Syria salvo is a return to the foreign policy of his predecessors. Limited, proportional missile strikes (i.e. intervention) as a response to the abhorrent usage of chemical weapons on civilians is in line with historical precedent. It is still fully possible, though, that Mr. Trump continues to believe in a transactional foreign policy and that these strikes are an exception—we simply don’t know. Consequently, one must ask: does a Trump Doctrine exist?
IN THE latest edition of Commentary, Noah Rothman makes the incisive argument that not only is there no Trump Doctrine but that there need not be one: “Doctrines are evolutionary. They form organically and over the course of years, often in response to very specific challenges from a unique set of threats to American national interests.” Mr. Rothman’s argument is fair-minded and persuasive, and this point should be conceded.
But even if it’s too early to bemoan the absence of a Trump Doctrine, Mr. Trump’s mercurial, indeterminate approach to formulating his foreign policy spooks allies and adversaries alike. The frantic visits and tense press conferences with our allies in recent days exposes the strain put on alliances by Mr. Trump’s nebulous foreign policy. Nor should the U.S. derive pleasure from unnerving its adversaries in this manner. It is in America’s interest for its foes to be able to anticipate the U.S. response to a given action, as this forms the foundation of our nuclear deterrence and collective security policies.
The 59 Tomahawk missiles lobbed at the al-Shayrat airfield last week could very well be a bellwether for a cogent, more rational approach to international relations. In this optimistic case, the Trump administration has signaled a sensible position that has the backing of Congress and, crucially, has been done before successfully. But it just as well could be a bellwether for further foreign policy incoherence—in which case the possible existence of some mythic Trump Doctrine will be moot.
